Two More Algorithms for Randomized Signature-Free Asynchronous Binary
  Byzantine Consensus with $t < n/3$ and $O(n^2)$ Messages and $O(1)$ Round
  Expected Termination by Crain, Tyler
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
08
76
5v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  2
0 F
eb
 20
20
Two More Algorithms for Randomized Signature-Free
Asynchronous Binary Byzantine Consensus with t < n/3 and
O(n2) Messages and O(1) Round Expected Termination
Tyler Crain1
1tcrainwork@gmail.com
February 21, 2020
Abstract
This work describes two randomized, asynchronous, round based, Binary Byzantine faulty
tolerant consensus algorithms based on the algorithms of [25] and [26]. Like the algorithms
of [25] and [26] they do not use signatures, use O(n2) messages per round (where each message
is composed of a round number and a constant number of bits), tolerate up to one third failures,
and have expected termination in constant number of rounds.
The first, like [26], uses a weak common coin (i.e. one that can return different values at
different processes with a constant probability) to ensure termination. The algorithm consists
of 5 to 7 message broadcasts per round. An optimization is described that reduces this to 4 to
5 broadcasts per round for rounds following the first round. Comparatively, [26] consists of 8 to
12 message broadcasts per round.
The second algorithm, like [25], uses a strong common coin (i.e. one that returns the same
value at all non-faulty processes) for both termination and correctness. Unlike [25], it does not
require a fair scheduler to ensure termination. Furthermore, the algorithm consists of 2 to 3
message broadcasts for the first round and 1 to 2 broadcasts for the following rounds, while [26]
consists of 2 to 3 broadcasts per round.
1 Introduction and related work.
Binary byzantine consensus concerns the problem of getting a set of distinct processes distributed
across a network to agree on a single binary value 0 or 1 where processes can fail in arbitrary ways.
It is well known that this problem is impossible in an asynchronous network with at least one faulty
process [17]. To get around this, algorithms can employ randomization [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 19, 20, 25, 26,
30, 32, 34], or rely on an additional synchrony assumption [13, 14]. Randomized algorithms largely
rely on the existence of a local or common random coin. The output of local coin is only visible to
an individual process, while the output of a common coin is visible to all processes, but only once a
threshold of processes have participated in computing the coin. A strong common coin is one that
outputs the same value at all processes while a weak one may output different values at different
processes with a fixed probability [32].
This work presents two algorithms that do not use signatures, use O(n2) messages per round
(where each message is composed of a round number and a constant number of bits), tolerate up
to one third failures (a well know lower bound [21]), and have expected termination in a constant
number of rounds.
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The first algorithm uses a weak common coin and is based on the BV-Broadcast and SBV-
Broadcast abstractions of [26]. It consists of two invocations of SBV-Broadcast per round with an
additional normal message broadcast in between. In the algorithm processes perform between 5 and
7 message broadcasts per round. An optimization is described that reduces this to 5 to 6 broadcasts
for the first round and 4 to 5 broadcasts for following rounds. Comparatively, the algorithm in [26]
that solves Byzantine Binary Consensus with the same guarantees and uses between 8 and 12
message broadcasts per round.
The second algorithm uses a strong common coin which allows a reduction of the number
of messages processes broadcast per round to between 2 to 3 for the first round and 1 to 2 for
all following rounds. In each round processes either decide the same value as the output of the
common coin for that round or continue to the next round without deciding. It is based on the
algorithm of [25] that solves Byzantine Binary Consensus with the same guarantees, but requires a
fair scheduler to ensure termination and uses between 2 and 3 message broadcasts per round. The
algorithms of [11, 10, 12] all follow simmilar designs except with different assumptions, where [10, 11]
uses signatures with [11] relying on a synchrony assumption for terminaton, and [12] does not use
signatures but also relies on a synchrony assumption for termination. Note that [23] presents
a modification of [25] that uses an additional message broadcast to remove the fair scheduler
requirement, bringing up the number of broadcasts per round to between 3 and 4.
Note that one of the notable properties of the algorithms presented in this work, as well as
those in [25] and [26] is that they do not use signatures within the description of the consensus.
Although it is common knowledge that common coins are implemented using signatures, such as
the efficient coin of [7], and that encrypted communication is often setup using signatures, such
as with TLS, signatures do have disadvantages such as that they require expensive computations
and increase message size by a non-insignificant number of bytes. Therefore, while in practice
these algorithms will still require the use of signatures, not using signatures within the consensus
remains beneficial. Still, many asynchronous binary consensus algorithms exist that use signatures
and signatures have many advantages. Apart from the advantages provided directly by signatures
themselves such as irrefutable, algorithms using them can be less complex, for example in the
algorithm of [7], which uses a weak common coin, processes perform 2 broadcasts per round and in
the algorithm of [10], which uses a strong common coin, processes broadcast 1 message per round.
Given the different tradeoffs of using signatures or not there are many randomized algorithms that
use them [10, 32, 34, 8, 7] and many that do not [5, 3, 10, 18, 33].
While the binary consensus problem only allows process to agree on a single binary value,
there exist many reductions to multi-value consensus [27, 28, 35, 36] allowing processes to agree
on arbitrary values. Furthermore many algorithms [4, 9] exists that solve multi-value consensus
directly through the use of types of synchrony assumptions to ensure termination. Additionally,
algorithms exists that make many different assumptions about the model such as synchrony [15],
different fault models [22, 24, 31], solve different definitions of consensus [29], and so on.
2 A Byzantine Computation Model.
This section describes the assumed computation model.
Asynchronous processes. The system is made up of a set Π of n asynchronous sequential
processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}; i is called the “index” of pi. “Asynchronous” means that each
process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary with time and remains unknown to the other
processes. “Sequential” means that a process executes one step at a time. This does not prevent it
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from executing several threads with an appropriate multiplexing. Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y
are used to say that pi belongs to the set Y .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an
asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that there is no bound on
message transfer delays, but these delays are finite. “Reliable” means that the network does not
lose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that any pair of processes is
connected by a bidirectional channel. A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking
the primitive “send tag(m) to pj”, where tag is the type of the message and m its content. To
simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process pi
receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. The macro-operation broadcast tag(m)
is used as a shortcut for “for each pi ∈ Π do send tag(m) to pj end for”.
Failure model. Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [31]. A Byzantine process
is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary
messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine
processes can collude to “pollute” the computation (e.g., by sending messages with the same con-
tent, while they should send messages with distinct content if they were non-faulty). A process that
exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. Moreover, it is assumed
that the Byzantine processes do not fully control the network in that they can not corrupt the
messages sent by non-faulty processes. Byzantine processes can control the network by modifying
the order in which messages are received, but they cannot postpone forever message receptions.
A Common Coin. The model is enriched with the same common coin (CC) as in [26] that was
originally defined in [32]. The common coin outputs a binary value at each non-faulty process for
each round. All non-faulty processes output 0 in round r with probability 1/d and output 1 in round
r with probability 1/d. Non-faulty processes output different values in round r with probability
(d−2)/d, where d ≥ 2 is a known constant. The output of the coin is revealed by calling a function
random() provided by a random oracle. The output of the coin is unpredictable and random and
its output is only revealed for a round r once at least one non-faulty process has called random()
in that round (i.e. faulty processes cannot compute the output of the coin entirely themselves).
A Strong (t+ 1) Common Coin. A strong common coin (SCC) is defined as a common coin
that has d = 2 meaning that in every round all non-faulty processes receive the same output from
the common coin. Furthermore t+1 means the output of the coin for round r is not revealed until
at least t+ 1 non-faulty processes have called called random() in that round.
Notations.
• The acronym BAMPn,t[∅] is used to denote the basic Byzantine Asynchronous Message-
Passing computation model; ∅ means that there is no additional assumption.
• The basic computation model strengthened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted
BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
• BAMPn,t[t < n/3] enriched with the common coin is denoted BAMPn,t[t < n/3, CC].
• BAMPn,t[t < n/3] enriched with the strong (t + 1) common coin is denoted BAMPn,t[t <
n/3, SCC].
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Before presenting the algorithms, the BV-Broadcast and SBV-Broadcast abstractions from [26]
are recalled. Note that within the consensus algorithms multiple instances of these abstractions
may be used, so to differentiate between these instances they are called with unique tags (denoted
as tag in the presentation of the abstractions).
2.1 The BV-Broadcast abstraction from [26] in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
operation BV broadcast tag(vi) is
(01) bin values i ← ∅
(02) broadcast b val(vi)
(03) return bin values i // bin valuesi has not necessarily obtained its final value when returned
when b val(v) is received
(04) if (b val(v) received from (t+ 1) different processes and b val(v) not yet broadcast)
(05) then broadcast b val(v) // a process echos a value only once
(06) end if;
(07) if (b val(v) received from (2t+ 1) different processes)
(08) then bin values i ← bin values i ∪ {v} // local delivery of a value
(09) end if.
Figure 1: An algorithm implementing BV-broadcast in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] from [26].
For each instance of BV-Broadcast, each non-faulty process pi calls the abstraction with a
unique tag tag for that instance and a binary value as input. It returns a set of binary values
bin values, which has not necessarily achieved its final state when returned (i.e. the implementation
of the abstraction may add items later). The abstraction ensures the following properties:
• BV-Termination. The invocation of BV broadcast() by a non-faulty process terminates.
• BV-Justification. If pi is non-faulty and v ∈ bin values i, then v has been BV-Broadcast by a
non-faulty process.
• BV-Uniformity. If a value v is added to the set bin valuesi of a non-faulty process pi, even-
tually v ∈ bin valuesj at every non-faulty process pj.
• BV-Obligation. Eventually the set bin values i of a non-faulty process is non empty.
• BV-Single-value. If all non-faulty processes BV-Broadcast the same value v, v is eventually
added to the set bin values i of each non-faulty process pi.
Note that the values input by non-faulty processes for a specific instance need not be from the set
{0, 1}, they can be any values as long as the size of the set of values input by non-faulty processes
is between 1 and 2. An algorithm implementing the BV-Broadcast abstraction is presented in
Figure 1. The reader is referred to [26] for proofs and a description of the code.
2.2 The SBV-Broadcast abstraction from [26] in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
For each instance of SBV-Broadcast, each non-faulty process pi calls the abstraction with a unique
tag tag for that instance and a binary value as input. It returns two sets of binary values, the
first being view and the second being bin values . While the set view has achieved its final state
when returned, bin values may not have (i.e. the implementation of the abstraction may add items
later). The abstraction ensures the following properties: (Note that the original SBV-Broadcast
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operation SBV broadcast tag(vi) is
(01) bin values i ← BV broadcast tag(vi);
(02) wait until(bin values i 6= ∅)
// bin valuesi has not necessarily obtained its final value when the wait terminates
(03) broadcast aux(w) where w ∈ bin values i
(04) wait until(∃ a set view i such that its values (i) belong to bin values i and
(ii) come from messages aux() received from (n− t) distinct processes);
(05) return(view i, bin values i)
Figure 2: An algorithm implementing SBV-Broadcast in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] from [26].
from [26] only returned a single set view , but the algorithms presented in this work will need an
additional property ensured by bin values . Also note that this set already exists in the original
implementation, here it is simply returned.)
• SBV-Termination. The invocation of SBV broadcast tag() by a non-faulty process terminates.
• SBV-Obligation. The set view i returned by a non-faulty process pi is not empty.
• SBV-Justification. If pi is non-faulty and v ∈ view i then a non-faulty process called SBV broadcast
v.
• SBV-Inclusion. If pi and pj are non-faulty processes and view i = {v} then v ∈ view j.
• SBV-Uniformity. If all non-faulty processes SBV broadcast the same value v, then view i = {v}
at every non-faulty process pi.
• SBV-Singleton. If pi and pj are non-faulty, [(view i = {v}) ∧ (viewj = {w})] =⇒ (v = w)
In this work the following additional property is introduced that was not originally included
in [26]:
• SBV-Binvalues. The set bin values i returned by a non-faulty process pi satisfies the BV-
Broadcast abstraction where non-faulty processes input the same values to this abstraction
as they did to the SBV-Broadcast abstraction. Furthermore the set bin values i at a non-faulty
process pi eventually contains every value returned in viewj at every non-faulty process pj.
An algorithm implementing the SBV-Broadcast abstraction is presented in Figure 2. The reader
is referred to [26] for full proofs and a description of the code. Here the SBV-Binvalues is proved
as it is added in this work.
Lemma 1. The algorithm of Figure 2 implements the SBV-Broadcast abstraction in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3].
Proof. All properties other than SBV-Binvalues are proved in [26]. Proof of the SBV-Binvalues
property: By line 04 the set view i returned on line 04 is the set bin values i returned by the call
to BV broadcast which satisfies the BV-Broadcast abstraction. By BV-Uniformity all processes
will eventually have the same set of values in their set bin values i which is the set returned by
SBV-Broadcast, the proof then follows.
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3 Binary Byzantine Consensus.
3.1 The Binary Consensus Problem.
In the binary consensus problem processes input a value to the algorithm, called their proposal,
run an algorithm consisting of several rounds, and eventually output a binary value called their
decision. Let V be the set of values that can be proposed. While V can contain any number (≥ 2) of
values in multi-valued consensus, it contains only two values in binary consensus, e.g., V = {0, 1}.
Assuming that each non-faulty process proposes a value, the binary Byzantine consensus (BBC)
problem is for each of them to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are
satisfied:
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
3.2 A Safe and Live Binary Byzantine Consensus Algorithm in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3, CC].
This section presents a Binary Byzantine Consensus algorithm using SBV-Broadcast in addition to
a weak common coin.
Message types. The following message types are used by the consensus (in addition to those
used by SBV-Broadcast).
• auxset[r](s). An auxset message contains a round number r and a set of binary values s.
Local variables. The following local variables are used at each process.
• ri. The current round at process i.
• view i[]. A map of sets of binary values at process i indexed by a round and an integer 0− 2.
• bin values i[]. A map of sets of binary values at process i indexed by a round.
• esti. The current binary estimate at process i.
3.2.1 Algorithm Description.
Figure 3 presents the algorithm. Non-faulty process call propose() with an initial binary proposal.
Line 01 initializes the processes’ estimate to its proposal and the round to 0. Non-faulty processes
then repeat lines 02-15 for each round.
First the round number is incremented on line 02. Non-faulty processes then call S broadcast
with tag stage[ri, 0] and input esti. By SBV-Singleton this call will output view i[ri, 0] with a
single unique value v or both binary values at all non-faulty processes.
The idea behind this SBV-Broadcast is that (i) if view i[ri, 0] = {v} at least 1 non-faulty process
then the remaining code if the round will ensure only v may be decided and additionally, if the
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operation propose(vi) is
(01) esti ← vi; ri ← 0;
repeat forever
(02) ri ← ri + 1;
(03) (view i[ri, 0], bin values i[ri])← SBV broadcast stage[ri, 0](esti);
// bin valuesi has not necessarily obtained its final value
(04) broadcast auxset[ri](view i[ri, 0]) // broadcast a set of binary values
(05) wait until(∃ a set view i[ri, 1] such that its values (i) belong to bin values i[ri] and
(ii) come from messages auxset[ri]() received from (n− t) distinct processes);
(06) if (viewi[ri, 1] = {w})
(07) then esti ← w
(08) else esti ← ⊥
(09) end if
(10) (view i[ri, 2], )← SBV broadcast stage[ri, 1](esti);
(11) s← random();
(12) case (view i[ri, 2] = {v} ∧ v 6= ⊥) then esti ← v; decide(v) if not yet done
(13) (view i[ri, 2] = {v,⊥}) then esti ← v
(14) (view i[ri, 2] = {⊥}) then esti ← s
(15) end case
end repeat.
Figure 3: An algorithm implementing binary consensus in BAMPn,t[t < n/3, CC].
output of the coin is also v at all all non-faulty processes, then they will set their estimate to v and
decide by the following round.
Otherwise, (ii) if view i[ri, 0] = {0, 1} at non-faulty processes before the value of the coin is
revealed then lines 04-05 are important to help non-faulty processes reach a decision. On line 04,
non-faulty processes broadcast auxset[ri](view i[ri, 0]) and on line 05 wait for (n − t) of these
messages from distinct processes where the values are contained in bin values i. The set view i[ri, 1]
is then computed as the set of these values. If view i[ri, 1] contains a single value then a process
sets its estimate to this value otherwise it sets its estimate to ⊥. If (t + 1) non-faulty processes
have view [i, 0] = {0, 1}, and broadcast auxset[r]({0, 1}), then given t < n/3, any set of (n − t)
auxset[r]() messages will contain at least one of these messages meaning all non-faulty process
will set their estimate to ⊥. The remaining code of the round will then ensure all processes set
their estimate to the output of the coin and decide in the following round if the coin outputs the
same value at all non-faulty processes.
Non-faulty processes then make a second call to SBV broadcast with tag stage[r, 1] and their
current estimate as input. This returns the set view [r, 2] (line 10). A call to random() is then made
on line 11. The purpose of this call to SBV broadcast is to ensure that through SBV-Uniformity
if a non-faulty process decides then all non-faulty processes set their estimates to the same value
and decide in the following round. For this, if view [r, 2] is a single value then this value is decided
and is set as the processes’ estimate (line 12), otherwise if view contains both a binary value and
⊥ then the binary value is set to the processes’ estimate (line 13), otherwise view [r, 2] = {⊥} and
the process sets its output to the value of the coin (line 14). Non-faulty processes then continue on
to the next round.
3.2.2 Proofs.
This section shows that the algorithm of Figure 3 solves Binary Byzantine consensus and terminates
in an expected constant number of rounds.
Lemma 2. At the start of every round each non-faulty process has a binary estimate proposed by
a non-faulty process.
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Proof. The initial estimate at non-faulty processes is set to its binary proposal v on line 01. The es-
timate is then input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. SBV-Justification and SBV-Binvalues
then ensure both view [r, 0] and view [r, 1] only contain binary values proposed by non-faulty pro-
cesses. The estimate is then set to either a binary value from view [r, 1] or ⊥ if both 0 and 1 are
contained in view [r, 1] on lines 07-08. The estimate is then input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on
line 10. By SBV-Justification view [r, 2] can only contain binary values or ⊥ where ⊥ means both
1 and 0 were proposed by non-faulty processes. On lines 12-14 the estimate is then set to either
the binary value in view [r, 2], or the value of random() if ⊥ ∈ view [r, 2], where in either case the
value must have been proposed by a non-faulty process. From this the next round is then started
with a binary estimate proposed by a non-faulty process and the proof is the same for all following
rounds.
Lemma 3. Only ⊥ or binary values can be input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 by non-
faulty processes. The binary values input have been proposed by non-faulty processes or if ⊥ is input
then both 0 and 1 have been proposed by non-faulty processes.
Proof. By Lemma 2 all non-faulty processes start each round with a binary estimate proposed by a
non-faulty process which is input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. Now by SBV-Binvalues,
bin values will only contain binary values at non-faulty processes. Thus view [r, 1] will only contain
binary values (line 05) proposed by non-faulty processes and lines 06-08 will ensure only ⊥ (if both
0 and 1 have been proposed by a non-faulty process) or a binary value is input to SBV broadcast
stage[r, 1] on line 10 by non-faulty processes.
Lemma 4. Non-faulty processes will only decide binary values proposed by non-faulty processes.
Proof. From line 12 non-faulty processes can only decide binary values output by SBV broadcast
stage[r, 1] (lines 10-12). By Lemma 3 and SBV-Justification these values must have been proposed
by non-faulty processes.
Lemma 5. If in a round r, view [r, 0] contains a single binary value w at a non-faulty process, then
all non-faulty processes either input w or ⊥ to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1].
Proof. If view [r, 0] = {w} at a non-faulty process, then by Lemma 2 and SBV-Singleton either
view [r, 0] = {w} or view [r, 0] = {0, 1} at all non-faulty processes. Now non-faulty processes will
either broadcast either auxset[r]({w}) or auxset[r]({0, 1}) on line 04. Given t < n/3 no non-
faulty process will receive n− t auxset[r]({¬w}) messages from distinct processes and as a result
view[r, 1] will be set to either {w} or {0, 1} at all non-faulty processes on line 05. Now by lines 06-
08 all non-faulty processes will set their estimate to w or ⊥ which is then input to SBV broadcast
stage[r, 1].
Lemma 6. For any round r, if a non-faulty process inputs a binary value v to SBV broadcast
stage[r, 1] on line 10 then all non-faulty processes either input v or ⊥ to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1].
Proof. By Lemma 2, Lemma 5 and SBV-Justification this holds true for all cases except where
all non-faulty processes have view [r, 0] = {0, 1}. In this case and given t < n/3 all non-faulty
processes will receive at least t + 1 auxset[r]({0, 1}) messages from distinct processes and as a
result view [r, 1] = {0, 1} at all non-faulty processes (line 05). All non-faulty processes then set their
estimate to ⊥ on line 08 which is then input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] and the lemma holds.
Lemma 7. Non-faulty processes complete each round.
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Proof. By Lemma 2 all non-faulty processes start each round with a binary estimate which is
input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. By SBV-Termination all processes will complete
the call to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] line 03 and broadcast auxset[r](view [r, 0]) on line 04. By
Lemma 2 and SBV-Binvalues the set view [r, 0] will contain binary values from bin values . Given
this, all non-faulty processes will then receive (n− t) auxset[r](s) messages from distinct processes
where s ∈ bin values and complete line 05. Non-faulty processes will then call and complete
SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 by SBV-Termination. All non-faulty processes will then call
random() on line 11 which will return a binary value.
From Lemma 6 which ensure no two distinct binary values will be input to SBV broadcast
stage[r, 1] on line 10 and from SBV-Justification view [ri, 2] will contain either a single binary
value or a single binary value and ⊥, which will then match a valid case on lines 12-15. Processes
will then continue to the next round where the same proof construction applies.
Lemma 8. If all non-faulty processes start a round r with the same binary estimate v then they
all decide v in round r (if not already done) and never decide a different value in following rounds.
Proof. By definition of the lemma, in round r all non-faulty processes input the same estimate v to
SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. By SBV-Uniformity all non-faulty processes have view [r, 0] =
{v} and by SBV-Binvalues only v can be contained in bin values at non-faulty processes. All
non-faulty processes then broadcast auxset[r]({v}) on line 04 and set view[r, 1] to {v} on line 05.
Following this est is set to v on line 07. All non-faulty processes then input v to SBV broadcast
stage[r, 1] on line 10 and by SBV-Uniformity have view [r, 2] = {v}. All non-faulty processes then
set est to v and decide v (line 12) if not yet done and then start round r+1 with the same binary
estimate v for which the same proof holds.
Lemma 9. No two non-faulty processes decide different values.
Proof. Let r be the first round where a non-faulty process decides. By line 12 for a process to decide,
a single binary value v must have been returned from SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10. Given
this and SBV-Justification a non-faulty process must have input v to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1]
on line 10. Furthermore by Lemma 6 only v or ⊥ could have been input by non-faulty processes
to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1]. Now given SBV-Justification and SBV-Singleton view [r, 2] must be
either {v} or {v,⊥} at all non-faulty processes. Thus on lines 12-13 all non-faulty processes will
set est = v and either decide v or not decide in round r. Lemma 8 then ensures that in following
rounds all non-faulty processes decide only v.
Lemma 10. Non-faulty processes decide in expected O(1) rounds.
Proof. By definition, the value output by the coin will not be revealed in a round r until at least
1 non-faulty processes has called random(), i.e. a non-faulty process has reached line 11.For a
non-faulty process to reach this line it must have received n − t messages from distinct processes
on line 05 meaning at least t + 1 non-faulty processes have reached line 04 in round r before the
coin is revealed. Consider the following two possible cases at the point where the t+1th non-faulty
process reaches this line, and before the value of the coin for round r is revealed (note that by
Lemma 7 all non-faulty processes will eventually reach this line).
• First assume that at least one of the t+ 1 non-faulty processes had view [r, 0] returned from
SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] (line 03) containing a single binary value w. Now by Lemma 5
all non-faulty processes will input either ⊥ or w into SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] (line 10).
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Then by SBV-justification all non-faulty processes will have either {w} or {w,⊥} or {⊥} as
view [r, 2]. Now if the output of the coin is w at all non-faulty processes then by lines 12-14
they all will set their estimates to w. Thus with probability of at least 1/d all non-faulty
processes will set their estimate to the same binary value and by Lemma 8 will decide by the
following round.
• Otherwise, given Lemma 2 and SBV-Justification the t+1 non-faulty processes must have had
view [r, 0] returned from SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] (line 03) as the set {0, 1} and broadcast
auxset[r]({0, 1}) on line 04. Now given t < n/3, at all non-faulty processes on line 05 any set
of messages from (n−t) distinct processes will contain at least one auxset[r]({0, 1}) message.
With this and by SBV-Binvalues all non-faulty processes will eventually have view [r, 1] =
{0, 1} and will set est ← ⊥ on line 08. All non-faulty processes will then input ⊥ into
SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 and will return {⊥} as view [r, 2] by SBV-Uniformity.
All non-faulty processes will then set their estimates to the output of the coin on line 14.
Thus with probability of at least 1/d all non-faulty processes will set their estimate to the
same binary value and by Lemma 8 will decide by the following round.
In both cases in round r non-faulty processes reach a state where they will reach a decision with
probability of at least 1/d, or decision is ensured with probability 1−
∏
∞
r=1 1/d = 1. From this, the
expected number of rounds to reach a state from which a decision is ensured is
∑
∞
r=1
r
d
(1− 1
d
)r−1 = d
with all non-faulty processes deciding by round d+ 1.
Theorem 1. The algorithm presented in Figure 3 solves the Binary consensus problem in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3, CC].
Proof. First recall the definition of Binary Byzantine Consensus.
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
BBC-Termination is ensured by Lemma 10. BBC-Agreement and BBC-Validity are ensured by
Lemmas 9 and 4 respectively.
Message broadcasts. As defined in [26], the implementation of the SBV-Broadcast abstraction
consists of 2 to 3 message broadcasts. The algorithm of Figure 3 consists of a single message
broadcast and two instances of SBV-Broadcasts, or 5 to 7 message broadcasts. Section 3.5 describes
a way to reduce this to 4 to 5 broadcasts.
3.3 The S-Broadcast abstraction in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
The following sections present a Binary Byzantine consensus algorithm based on the Algorithm
of [26] that uses a strong (t + 1) common coin for correctness and termination. Each round of
the algorithm of [26] consists of a call to BV-Broadcast followed by a normal message broadcast.
Unfortunately here, in order to remove the fair scheduler requirement of [26] without increasing
the number of message broadcasts the BV-Broadcast abstraction can no longer be used. Instead
an S-Broadcast abstraction is introduced that can be thought of as breaking the BV-Broadcast
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operation S broadcast tag(vi, should broadcast i) is
(01) s valuei ← false
(02) if (should broadcast i = true) then broadcast tag, s val(vi) end if
(03) return s valuei
// the Boolean pointed to by s valuei has not necessarily obtained its final value when returned
when tag, s val(v) is received where (v = vi)
(04) if (tag, s val(v) received from (t+ 1) different processes and tag, s val(v) not yet broadcast)
(05) then broadcast tag, s val(v) // a process echos a value only once
(06) end if;
(07) if (tag, s val(v) received from (2t+ 1) different processes)
(08) then s valuei ← true // local delivery of a value
(09) end if.
Figure 4: An algorithm implementing S-broadcast in BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
abstraction into two separate instances of S-Broadcast, one for each binary value. Note that it
follows a classical approach of broadcast/echo used in many similar abstractions.
The S-Broadcast abstraction takes as input a value v, and a Boolean value should broadcast . It
returns a pointer to a Boolean variable s value. It is expected that if a non-faulty process calls S-
Broadcast for a value v then all non-faulty processes call S-Broadcast for value v. The S-Broadcast
abstraction ensures the following properties.
• S-Termination. The invocation of S broadcast() by a non-faulty process terminates.
• S-Justification. If s valuei returned by a call to S-Broadcast with value v at a non-faulty
process pi has s valuei = true, then a non-faulty process has called S broadcast(v, true)
• S-Uniformity. If s valuei returned by a call to S-Broadcast with value v at a non-faulty
process pi has s valuei = true, then eventually s valuej = true at every non-faulty process
pj .
• S-Obligation. If at least t + 1 non-faulty processes have called S broadcast(v, true), then
eventually s valuei = true at every non-faulty process pi.
An implementation of S-Broadcast is described in Figure 4. Here non-faulty processes call S-
Broadcast with an input v and a Boolean should broadcast . On line 01 non-faulty processes initiate
the s value variable to false. If should broadcast is true, then non-faulty processes broadcast a
message tag, s val(v). A pointer to s value is then returned, note that s value may become true
at a later point in time.
Lines 04-09 describe what happens when a message tag, s val(v) is received with a value v
equal to the input given during the invocation of S-Broadcast. If message tag, s val(v) has been
received from (t+ 1) distinct processes then the process broadcasts the same message if it has not
already done so (lines 04-05) (i.e. it echos the message). Next, if messages tag, s val(v) has been
received from (2t+ 1) distinct processes then the process sets s value to true (lines 07-08).
Lemma 11. Figure 4 satisfies the SBC-Broadcast abstraction.
Proof. Proof of S-Termination: Figure 4 has no blocking operations. Proof of S-Justification: If no
non-faulty process calls SBC-Broadcast with should broadcast = true then no non-faulty process
broadcasts tags val(v) on line 02. Given t, no non-faulty process receives (t + 1) tags val(v)
message from distinct processes and no non-faulty process broadcasts tags val(v) on line 05.
From this and given 2t+ 1 > t+ 1 no non-faulty process sets s value to true on line 08. Proof of
S-Uniformity: If a non-faulty process sets s value to true on line 08 then it has received (2t + 1)
tags val(v) messages from distinct processes. From this and given t < n/3 all non-faulty processes
will receive at least (t+1) tags val(v) messages from distinct processes and broadcast tags val(v)
if not already done (line 05). From this all non-faulty processes will receive at least (2t+1) messages
from distinct processes and set s value ← true (line 08). Proof of S-Obligation: If at least (t+ 1)
non-faulty processes call S-Broadcast with should broadcast = true then these processes broadcast
tags val(v) on line 02 (if not already done) and all non-faulty processes receive at least (t + 1)
messages from distinct processes. The proof follows using the same arguments as S-Uniformity.
3.4 A Safe and Live Consensus Algorithm in BAMPn,t[t < n/3, SCC].
This section presents a Binary Byzantine Consensus algorithm using S-Broadcast in addition to a
strong (t+ 1) common coin.
Message types. The following message types are used by the consensus.
• aux[r](s). An aux message contains a round number r and a binary value s.
Local variables. The following local variables are used at each process.
• ri. The current round at process i.
• si. The binary value returned by the most recent call to random() at process i.
• support coini. A Boolean variable that indicates if the current estimate at processes i is equal
to the value of the most recent coin flip.
• bin ptr i. A list of two pointers to Boolean variables returned by calls to S-Broadcast at
process i, where bin ptr i[0] represents the pointer returned by a call to S broadcast(0, ) and
bin ptr i[1] represents the pointer returned by a call to S broadcast(1, ).
Algorithm description. Figure 5 presents the algorithm. Before describing the algorithm line
by line some key points are introduced. First note that, given lines 12-13, only the value of the coin
can be decided in a round. Second, given line 04, only the negation of the coin from the previous
round is S-Broadcast in all rounds following the first round. These two points help support the
intuition of the design of the algorithm as follows (assume it is given that the output of the coin
in a round r is s): (i) given that ¬s could not have been decided in round r, if s was a possible
valid decision in round r then it remains so in round r + 1, so a process can immediately support
s in round r + 1 and (ii) given that s could have been decided in round r, ¬s must be checked in
round r + 1 to see if it is still a valid value to decide. Using this and various thresholds (including
the t+ 1 threshold of the coin) and broadcasts liveness and correctness is then ensured.
The algorithm is now briefly described. Non-faulty processes call propose() with their initial
proposal v. Line 01 initiates the local variables so that on lines 02-04 non-faulty processes call
bin ptr [¬v] ← S broadcast est[1](¬v, false) and bin ptr [v]← S broadcast est[1](v, true), (i.e. in
round 1 they call the S-Broadcast abstraction for both 0 and 1, but with support coin = true only
for their initial proposal). Given t < n/3 and S-Obligation at at least one of the bin ptr variables
point to a Boolean variable that becomes true and by S-Justification was proposed by a non-faulty
process in the first round.
operation propose(vi) is
(01) si ← ¬vi; ri ← 0; support coini = false;
(02) bin ptr
i
[si]← S broadcast est[1](si, false);
// the Boolean pointed to by bin ptr
i
[si] has not necessarily obtained its final value at this point
repeat forever
(03) ri ← ri + 1;
(04) bin ptr
i
[¬si]← S broadcast est[ri](¬si,¬support coini);
// the Boolean pointed to by bin ptr
i
[¬si] has not necessarily obtained its final value at this point
(05) wait until(bin ptr
i
[0] = true ∨ bin ptr
i
[1] = true);
(06) case (support coin
i
= true) then w ← si
(07) (bin ptr
i
[0] = true) then w ← 0
(08) (bin ptr
i
[1] = true) then w ← 1
(09) end case;
(10) broadcast aux[ri](w);
(11) wait until(∃ a set view i[ri] such that (i) for v ∈ view i[ri], bin ptr i[v] = true
(ii) its values come from messages aux[ri]() received from (n− t) distinct processes);
(12) si ← random();
(13) case (view i[ri] = {si}) then support coini = true; decide(si) if not done yet;
(14) (view i[ri] = {0, 1}) then support coini = true
(15) else support coin
i
= false
(16) end case;
end repeat
Figure 5: An algorithm implementing binary consensus in BAMPn,t[t < n/3, SCC].
Lines 03-16 are repeated for each round. The round starts by incrementing the round variable
(line 03. Non-faulty processes then make a call to S broadcast on line 04 with the negation of
the coin from the previous round and the negation of the Boolean variable support coin set on
the previous round as inputs. This ensures that the input should broadcast to S broadcast is only
true if the process decided not to support the output coin from the previous round. Given that
the coin could have been decided in the previous round, this call to the S-Broadcast abstraction
is to check if the negation of the coin remains a possible value to decide in round r + 1. The
bin ptr pointer to the Boolean variable corresponding to the coin is not changed as its state of
being a value that can be decided remains the same as the previous round. Non-faulty processes
then wait on line 05 until at least one of the bin ptr variables point to a true Boolean value. On
lines 06-09 processes compute the value w that they broadcast in an aux[r]() message on line 10.
This value w is either the value of the coin from the previous round if support coin = true or
a binary value for which bin ptr [w] = true. The set view [r] is then computed on line 11 from
the the values included with aux[r]() messages received from (n − t) distinct processes for which
the corresponding bin ptr variables point to a true Boolean. The strong (t + 1) common coin is
then computed on line 14. If view[r] contains a single value equal to the output of the coin then
that value is decided on line 13 and support coin is set to true. Otherwise if view[r] = {0, 1},
support coin is set to true and no value is decided (line 14). Otherwise support coin is set to false
and no value is decided (line 15). Given t < n/3, if a non-faulty process decided then any set
of (n − t) aux[r]() messages contain at least one message supporting the coin, thus ensuring all
non-faulty processes set support coin ← true. The round is then complete and the next round is
started.
3.4.1 Proofs.
This section shows that the algorithm of Figure 5 solves Binary Byzantine consensus and terminates
in an expected constant number of rounds.
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Lemma 12. Non-faulty processes complete each round.
Proof. Each non-faulty process proposes an initial binary value v. By S-Termination all non-faulty
processes will reach line 05 calling S-Broadcast with both 0 and 1 on lines 02,04. On line 03 each
non-faulty process calls bin ptr [¬v] ← S broadcast est[1](v, true) (note that here the variables
are replaced to show that non-faulty processes are calling S-Broadcast with their proposal and
true as input). Given that t < n/3 at least one of the S-broadcast instances will be called with
should broadcast = true for a single binary value by at least t+ 1 non-faulty processes, and by S-
Obligation the condition on line 06 will be satisfied. It follows that either line 08 or line 09 (or both)
be satisfied at all non-faulty processes and they will broadcast aux[1](w) where bin ptr [w] = true.
Now given S-Obligation all non-faulty processes will receive at least (n− t) aux[1]() messages with
values w that satisfy bin ptr [w] = true. All non-faulty processes will then call random() and the
value of the coin will be output. The case on lines 13-15 will then be completed and non-faulty
processes will continue onto round 2.
Now consider by induction that all non-faulty processes have completed round r. Let the
output of the coin in round r be binary value s. If a non-faulty process sets support coin = true
in round r it must have had bin values [s] = true (lines 13,14), and given the pointer bin values [s]
is not modified in round r + 1, bin values [s] = true at all non-faulty processes in round r + 1 by
S-Obligation. Call this note property (a).
Consider the following two cases representing the values of support coin set in round r at non-
faulty processes:
• At least t+1 non-faulty processes set support coin ← false in round r on line 15. Now given
the strong property of the coin, these processes will then call bin ptr [¬s]← S broadcastest[r+
1](¬s, true) and by S-Obligation eventually bin ptr [¬s] = true at all non-faulty processes
in round r + 1 and the wait condition on line 05 will be satisfied. From this and by (a)
all non-faulty processes will broadcast messages aux[r + 1](v) where bin ptr [v] = true on
line 10 which will ensure the wait on line 11 will be completed and all non-faulty processes
will continue to round r + 2.
• Otherwise less than t+1 non-faulty processes set supportcoin← false in round r on line 15.
In this case less than t + 1 non-faulty processes will call bin ptr [¬s] ← S broadcastest[r +
1](¬s, true) and by S-Justification bin ptr [¬s] = false in round r + 1. Furthermore given
t < n/3 and by (a) bin values [s] = true at all non-faulty processes, all non-faulty processes
will set w ← s on lines 06-08 and broadcast aux[r+1](s) on line 10. The wait on line 10 will
then be satisfied and all non-faulty processes will continue to round r + 2.
This completes the proof by induction.
Lemma 13. If a non-faulty process decides a binary value v in a round r, then at every non-faulty
process (i) in every round ≥ r, bin ptr [v] = true (eventually) and no non-faulty process decides
¬v and (ii) in every round > r, bin ptr [¬v] = false.
Proof. Let r be the first round where a non-faulty process decides and v be the binary value it
decides. For this to happen the following must be true: bin ptr [v] = true by line 11 and s = v
by line 13. Additionally, by the strong property of the coin, and by S-Obligation these will be
true at all non-faulty processes. Furthermore, by line 11 a process that decides must have received
(n − t) aux[r](v) messages from (n − t) distinct processes. Now given that t < n/3, any set of
(n−t) aux[r]() messages from distinct processes must contain at least one aux[r](v) message. Thus
by lines 13-14 all non-faulty processes will set support coin = true and no non-faulty process will
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decide ¬v in round r. Now in round r+1 all non-faulty processes will call bin ptr [¬v]← S broadcast
est[r+1](¬v, false) and by S-Justification bin ptr [¬v] = false at all non-faulty processes. From
this non-faulty processes will compute view [r + 1] = {v} on line 11. Furthermore given bin ptr [v]
is not modified from round r, bin ptr [v] = true in round r + 1.
Now consider by induction that the lemma is true in a round ρ. First note that given bin ptr [v] =
true and bin ptr [¬v] = false in round ρ, view [ρ] = {v} at all non-faulty processes by lines 10-11.
Consider the two possible cases for the output of the coin in round ρ:
• The output of random() in round ρ is v. Here the case on line 13 is satisfied and all non-faulty
processes set support coin = true and decide(v) if not done already. In round ρ+ 1 all non-
faulty processes call bin ptr [¬v] ← S broadcast est[ρ + 1](¬v, false) and by S-Justification
bin ptr [¬v] = false at all non-faulty processes. Furthermore given bin ptr [v] is not modified
from round ρ, bin ptr [v] = true in round ρ + 1. From this non-faulty processes compute
view [ρ+ 1] = {v} on line 11 and do not decide ¬v.
• Otherwise the output of random() in round ρ is ¬v. Here the case on line 15 is satisfied and
all non-faulty processes set support coin ← false. In round ρ + 1 all non-faulty processes
call bin ptr [v] ← S broadcast est[ρ + 1](v, true) and by S-Obligation bin ptr [v] = true
(eventually) at all non-faulty processes. Furthermore given bin ptr [¬v] is not modified from
round ρ, bin ptr [¬v] = false in round ρ + 1. From this non-faulty processes compute
view [ρ+ 1] = {v} on line 11 and do not decide ¬v.
This completes the proof by induction.
Lemma 14. No two non-faulty processes decide different values.
Proof. This follows directly from 13.
Lemma 15. Non-faulty processes only call S broadcast(v, true) if v was proposed by a non-faulty
process.
Proof. In round 1 this is true as non-faulty processes only call S broadcast(v, true) for their pro-
posal v. Now assume the lemma holds true in round r. In round r + 1 processes only call
S broadcast(v, true) if it set support coin to false on line 15 in round r. For this to happen by
line 11 bin ptr [v] must be true in round r. The proof then follows by S-Justification and induc-
tion.
Lemma 16. Non-faulty processes only decide binary values proposed by non-faulty processes.
Proof. By Lemma 15 and S-Justification the pointers bin ptr at non-faulty processes only have value
true if S broadcast(v, true) was called by a non-faulty process with their corresponding binary value
v. By lines 11 and 13 a non-faulty process can only decide a binary value v if bin ptr [v] = true,
the proof follows.
Lemma 17. Given a binary value s as the output of the call to random() in a round r. If all non-
faulty processes start round r+1 with support coin = true, then all non-faulty processes decide (if
they have not done so already) in the first round ρ > r where the output of random() in round ρ is
s.
Proof. Given by definition that support coin = true at all non-faulty processes in round r + 1,
they must have executed either line 13 or 14 in round r and must have bin ptr [s] = true. Given
bin ptr [s] is not modified in round r it remains true in round r + 1. Now all non-faulty processes
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call bin ptr [¬s]← S broadcast est[r+1](¬s, false) on line 04 and by S-Justification bin ptr [¬s] =
false at all non-faulty processes in round r + 1. Notice now that bin ptr [¬s] = false and
bin ptr [s] = true at all non-faulty processes, call this state (a).
From state (a) in round r + 1 all non-faulty processes will broadcast aux[r + 1](s) on line 10
and have view [r + 1] = {v} from line 11.
Now if the call to random() returns s then all non-faulty processes decide on line 13.
Otherwise the call random() returns ¬s in round r+1 and all non-faulty processes set support coin =
false on line 15. In round r + 2 bin ptr [¬s] = false at all non-faulty processes given it
is not changed from round r + 1. All non-faulty processes then call bin ptr [s] ← S broadcast
est[r+2](¬s, true) on line 04 and by S-Obligation bin ptr [s] = true at all non-faulty processes in
round r+2. Notice that the non-faulty processes are once again in state (a) except in round r+2,
the proof then follows.
Lemma 18. Non-faulty processes decide in expected O(1) rounds.
Proof. Consider a round r. Given the t+1 property of the coin, at least t+1 non-faulty processes
have reached line 12 before the output of random() is revealed. Consider the following two cases
when the t+ 1th non-faulty process reaches this line:
• At least one of these non-faulty processes has computed view [r]← {v} on line 11, i.e. view [r]
contains a single binary value v. In this case if the output of the call to random() is v then
the process will decide v on line 13 and decide in the next round where the output of the coin
is v (if not done already) by Lemmas 13 and 17.
• Otherwise given t < n/3 all t + 1 of these non-faulty processes have set view [r] ← {0, 1}
on line 11. Let the output of the the call to random() be s in round r. Note that the wait
on line 11 and S-Uniformity ensure bin ptr [s] = true at all non-faulty processes in round r
and given the pointer is not changed in round r + 1, this remains true in round r + 1. Now
on line 14 the same t + 1 non-faulty processes set support coin ← true and in round r + 1
broadcast aux[r + 1](s). Given t < n/3 all sets of (n − t) distinct aux[r + 1]() messages
will contain at least one aux[r + 1](s) message. It then follows that s ∈ view [r + 1] at all
non-faulty processes. Now if the output of random() is s in round r + 1 then all non-faulty
processes will set support coin i ← true on lines 13 or line 14 and by Lemma 17 all non-faulty
processes will decide by the next round where the output of the call to random() is s.
In both cases in round r non-faulty processes reach a state where they will reach a decision with
probability of at least 1/2 by the strong property of the coin, or decision is ensured with probability
1−
∏
∞
r=1 1/2 = 1. From this, the expected number of rounds to reach a state from which a decision
is ensured is
∑
∞
r=1 r
1
2r = 2, and by Lemmas 17 and 13 all processes will decide by the next round
where the coin flip results in the same value, i.e. another expected 2 rounds.
Theorem 2. The algorithm presented in Figure 5 solves the Binary consensus problem in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3, CC].
Proof. First recall the definition of Binary Byzantine Consensus.
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
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• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
BBC-Termination is ensured by Lemma 18. BBC-Agreement and BBC-Validity are ensured by
Lemmas 14 and 16 respectively.
Message broadcasts. The S-Broadcast consists of at most 1 message broadcast. The first
round of the consensus algorithm consists of 2 instances of S-Broadcast (where non-faulty processes
perform a normal broadcast within at least one of these), followed by a normal message broadcast,
or 2 to 3 message broadcasts. All following rounds consist of a call to S-Broadcast followed by a
normal message broadcast, or 1 to 2 message broadcasts.
3.5 Optimization for the Safe and Live Consensus Algorithm in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3, CC] from Figure 3.
Notice that the strong (t + 1) common coin algorithm from Figure 5 uses the fact that a binary
value may remain valid from the previous round in order to only perform a single S-Broadcast per
round in rounds following the first round. A similar technique can be used to reduce the number of
broadcasts used by the SBV-Abstractions of the algorithm in Figure 3. Consider the binary value
v (v¬⊥) from view [r, 2] which may be set to non-faulty processes’ estimates on lines 12-13. By
Lemma 6 and SBV-Binvalues this can only be a single binary value and if such a value exists then all
non-faulty processes have it in their bin values returned from the call to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1].
With this, non-faulty processes can skip the initial broadcast of the value in the following round and
broadcast it directly within an aux message in SBV broadcast stage[r+1, 0], where the bin values
returned by SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] ensures its validity. Furthermore notice that this does not
affect termination as this binary value is only used in the termination proof when it is equal to the
value output by the coin at all non-faulty processes, in which case all non-faulty processes take this
value as the estimate regardless.
This optimization then can be further applied to ⊥ when input to the SBV broadcast stage[r, 1]
on line 10. Here processes can immediately broadcast ⊥ in the aux message, using the fact
that all non-faulty processes will bin values[r] = {0, 1} (the bin values returned by SBV broadcast
stage[r, 0]) as support. Again termination is not effected using a similar argument as before.
This optimization reduces the number of message broadcast performed by the SBV-Broadcast
abstraction from between 2 and 3 to between 1 and 2. Notice that if SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] only
uses a single broadcast, then SBV broadcast stage[r, 2] will use 2 broadcasts, as the single broadcast
of SBV broadcast stage[r, 2] can only be used for ⊥ which requires SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] to
use 2 broadcasts. Thus the number of message broadcasts performed per round becomes 4 to 5.
Note that a similar opimization could be applied to the algorithm of [12] that uses a similar
construction but relies on a synchrony assumption for termination.
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